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Abstract 
 
Following the commodity price shocks in 2007, anecdotal evidence shows that tenant farmers 
experienced large increases in cropland rental rates and input prices. However, it is unclear how 
residual profits (crop revenue less non-land costs) resulting from the price increases within this 
sector (if any) have been allocated among tenant farmers, landowners and input suppliers.  This 
work provides statistical evidence regarding how increases in corn prices and the associated 
increases in profitability ultimately flow through to the rental market, and which participants 
benefit the most.   
The purpose of this paper is to help fill the gap in the existing academic literature with 
respect to how the recent price shocks affected the agricultural rental market.  Using unique 
farm-level, longitudinal data from the Illinois Farm Bureau Farm Management (FBFM) office, a 
hedonic model of the determinants of Illinois’ cash rents per acre is constructed and the marginal 
contributions of parcel characteristics to the market price are derived.   A novel spatial 
econometric panel estimation method is employed to model the spatial error structure and ensure 
consistent estimators of the model parameters.  Lastly, the marginal benefits appropriated by 
each commodity production participant are estimated and the validity of Ricardian Rent Theory 
(RRT) is tested. 
The primary findings indicate that marginal output price increases have a significant 
effect on cash rents with strong spatial correlations detected in the data.  The estimated effect of 
increasing prices on cropland rents is substantially larger at the farm level, in comparison to a 
county aggregated model using similar data.  County level results find that marginal increases in 
the harvest futures price increases rents by around $24.00.  Under the farm level analysis, this 
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measure rises to over $41.00, perhaps implying that the aggregation process has a significant loss 
of information.  Second, as would be predicted by land rent theories, we find substantiating 
evidence that both inter-county and intra-county soil productivity variations have considerable 
impacts on cash rent levels, in that rents are positively associated with higher soil quality.  Third, 
we find that there is a risk premium embedded in the cash rental rate, in that parcels with a 
higher perceived yield risk result in a negative impact on the cash rent.  This is expected given 
the likely risk aversion of tenant operators.  Parcels within relatively rural areas as well as those 
operated by farmers with large scale operations also exhibit tendencies for higher rent levels, 
although this impact is rather minimal.  Lastly, we find limited support for RRT with a majority 
of increased revenues due to output price increases accruing to the farmer.  Tenant farmers 
capture 89% of the marginal increases in commodity prices while the landowner and input 
suppliers absorb only 3.3% and 7.7%, respectively.  The relatively large amount that is captured 
by the tenant farmer may be a form of ‘compensation’ for bearing price risk.  This would imply 
that tenant farmers cash renting cropland receive both a premium for yield risk as well as price 
risk. 
 
  
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1  Introduction ................................................................................................................1 
1.1  Purpose and Contribution ......................................................................................................2 
1.2  Overview ...............................................................................................................................4 
Chapter 2  Background .................................................................................................................6 
2.1  Illinois Agriculture and Recent Cash Rent Trends ................................................................6 
2.2  Commodity Price Levels and Volatility ................................................................................8 
2.3  A New Era? .........................................................................................................................10 
2.4  Charts and Figures ...............................................................................................................12 
Chapter 3  Land Rent Theories and Literature Review ..........................................................15 
3.1 Classical Rent Theory ..........................................................................................................15 
3.2 Neo-Classical Rent Theory ..................................................................................................17 
3.3 Capitalized Values and Rate of Return ................................................................................18 
3.4 Empirical Land Rent Models ...............................................................................................19 
3.5 Empirical Land Value Models .............................................................................................22 
3.6 Figures ..................................................................................................................................23 
Chapter 4  Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................24 
4.1 Hedonic Model .....................................................................................................................24 
4.2 Spatial Considerations ..........................................................................................................26 
4.3 Spatial Autoregressive Models (SAR) .................................................................................29 
Chapter 5  Data, Methods and Procedures ...............................................................................33 
5.1 Data ......................................................................................................................................33 
5.2 Variables Used in the Hedonic Rent Model .........................................................................34 
5.3 Assumptions .........................................................................................................................39 
5.4 Empirical Model ...................................................................................................................40 
5.5 Tables and Figures ...............................................................................................................44 
Chapter 6  Results ........................................................................................................................53 
6.1 Results Tables ......................................................................................................................58 
Chapter 7  Summary and Conclusion ........................................................................................60 
References .....................................................................................................................................63 
1 
 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
Following the commodity price shocks in 2007, anecdotal evidence implied that tenant farmers 
experienced large increases in cropland rental rates and input prices. However, it is unclear how 
residual profits (crop revenue less non-land costs) resulting from the price increases within this 
sector are allocated among tenant farmers, landowners and input suppliers.  Theories of land 
economics generally posit that a tenant farmer’s residual profits accrue to the landowner in the 
form of rent (Barlowe, 1986; Hubacek, 2002; O’Sullivan, 2003).  Given this approach, it is 
expected that the recent increases in agricultural rents would capture the bulk of additional 
revenues from rising commodity prices.  As land is an undeniably intricate piece of the 
agricultural system, identifying how rising commodity prices impact agricultural agents is an 
important question. Such information is relevant to commodity producers in making informed 
planting decisions, landowners in valuing their property, policy makers during the development 
and implementation of new agricultural programs, and grain markets when faced with 
forecasting.  This research empirically analyzes the impact of the recent commodity price shocks 
on Illinois agricultural cash rents.  Specifically, this work provides statistical evidence regarding 
increases in corn prices and the associated increases in profitability in the rental market, and 
which participants benefit most.   
Research exploring the factors affecting agricultural land values and rents has persisted 
with much focus on topics including biofuels (Henderson and Gloy, 2009; Du, Hennessy, and 
Edwards, 2008), government payments, conservation and land retirement programs (Nickerson 
and Lynch, 2001; Kirwan, 2009; Goodwin and Mishra, 2005; Taylor and Brester, 2005; Patton 
et. al, 2008; Shaik, 2007; Shaik, Helmers and Atwood, 2006), global warming (Mendelsohn and 
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Dinar, 2003), and urbanization pressures (Plantinga, Lubowski and Stavins, 2002; Livanis et. al, 
2006). However, the empirical impact of increasing commodity price levels on agricultural cash 
rents and respective land values has not gained as much attention as the recent disturbances in 
commodity price levels have not existed since the early 1970’s.  During the summer of 2008, 
corn and soybean futures prices rose approximately 119.8% and 91.9%, respectively, compared 
to the previous year.  The resulting nominal prices were the highest in history.  Agricultural land 
values quickly followed suit with Illinois experiencing a 19.3% increase in cropland values 
between 2007 and 2008, the largest year-over-year increase ever in the Corn Belt (USDA, 
2008a).  Du et. al presents a paper within this conceptual framework focusing in on impacts of 
corn futures prices on farmland cash rents in Iowa.  Searches for other contemporary, academic 
articles covering this topic lack any results with the exception of numerous condensed articles 
targeting farmers and landowners.   
 
1.1  Purpose and Contribution 
This study fills the gap in the existing academic literature and estimates the impact of the recent 
price shocks on the agricultural rental market.  Using unique farm-level, longitudinal data from 
the Illinois Farm Bureau Farm Management (FBFM) office, a hedonic model is constructed of 
the determinants of Illinois’ cash rents per acre and used to derive the marginal contributions of 
parcel characteristics to the market price.   Primary focus is placed upon anticipated and 
unanticipated commodity price movements and impacts on annual cash rental prices.  A novel 
spatial econometric panel estimation method is employed to model the spatial error structure and 
ensure consistent estimators of the model parameters.  Lastly, the marginal benefits appropriated 
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to each commodity production participant are approximated and the validity of Ricardian Rent 
Theory (RRT)1
Previous empirical studies analyzing cropland cash rents have generally been limited to 
aggregated county-level data which may hinder the extraction of information as opposed to 
analyzing the underlying unit data.  The aggregation process also severely restricts the number of 
observations available to the analyst.  The contributions of this paper are as follows.  First, it uses 
unique farm-level data allowing for more efficient and accurate estimates of the factors affecting 
land rents, including important spatial effects.  The use of farm-level data also provides nearly 
six times as many observations, relative to an aggregated county-level option, allowing for 
improved estimator precision.  Second, we include data through 2008 to observe the full impact 
of the price shocks experienced that summer in which corn and soybean futures prices reached 
an all time high.  Third, this analysis extends existing literature on the valuation of 
heterogeneous agricultural parcels.  By explicitly accounting for variations in soil quality, 
urbanization pressures, economies of scale, and economic characteristics, a clearer view of how 
commodity price changes ultimately flow through to rental markets is observed.  Lastly, we 
allow for heterogeneity across tenant farmers while explicitly controlling for the spatial nature 
inherent in the data by using a leading-edge spatial panel error component method (Kapoor et al., 
2007).  This approach to analyzing agricultural rents, or the impact that output prices have on 
rents has not, to the knowledge of the author, been used in previous studies.   
 is tested. 
The primary findings indicate that marginal output price increases have a significant 
effect on cash rents with strong spatial correlations.  The estimated effect of increasing prices on 
cropland rents is substantially larger at the farm level, compared to a county aggregated model 
                                                          
1 RRT predicts that any permanent increase in revenues will ultimately accrue to the landowner in the form of rent. 
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using similar data.  This may imply that valuable information is lost during the aggregation 
process. Second, as implied by land rent theories, substantiating evidence is found that both cross 
county and intra-county soil productivity variations impact cash rent levels.  Third, a risk 
premium is embedded in the cash rental rate, in that parcels with higher yield risk have lower 
rental prices.  This is expected given the likely risk aversion of tenant operators.  Parcels within 
relatively rural areas as well as those operated by farmers with large scale operations also exhibit 
tendencies for higher rent levels, although this impact is rather minimal.  Last, we find limited 
support for RRT with a vast majority of increased revenues accumulated by the tenant farmer in 
lieu of the landowner and input suppliers.  
 
1.2  Overview 
This study is organized as follows.  Chapter 2.1 describes the scope of Illinois' agricultural sector 
and recent trends in Illinois cash rents.  A discussion of recent commodity price drivers and the 
current price environment is then presented (Chapter 2.2 and 2.3).       
Chapter 3 provides a literature review of the basic theories on land rents and land value 
capitalization (Chapters 3.1-3.3). The remainder of the chapter provides a summary of previous 
studies investigating agricultural land rents. This section is subdivided into studies using hedonic 
approach estimations and those using income approaches. A brief review of recent agricultural 
land value studies is provided in Chapter 3.5.   
Chapter 4 presents the theoretical framework for this study.  A review of the hedonic 
model and the implicit price approach as applied to agricultural cash rents is provided in section 
4.1.  An underlying hypothesis of this study is that agricultural cash rents are related by an 
underlying spatial component.  The motivation for considering a spatial framework is presented 
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in section 4.2 including a brief overview of spatial correlation, its implications, and the definition 
of a “neighbor” within a spatial context.  Section 4.3 concludes with a discussion of the Spatial 
Autoregressive Error Model considered in this article (Anselin, 2002). 
Chapter 5 presents the data employed in this study.  Section 5.2 presents the dependent 
and independent variables used as well as their construction and the hypothesized effects of the 
independent variables on agricultural cash rents.  The remainder of the chapter describes the 
empirical method employed for estimation. 
Chapter 6 presents the results along with a discussion of the findings and implications.  
Chapter 7 concludes and suggests potential extensions and areas of future research.   
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Chapter 2  Background 
 
2.1  Illinois Agriculture and Recent Cash Rent Trends 
According to USDA-NASS estimates, approximately 27 million acres, or 75%, of Illinois’ total 
available land is dedicated to farming activities, with 88.5% of total farmland used in the 
cultivation of commodity products (USDA 2009a).  In 2007, corn made up the majority of all 
farm receipts in Illinois constituting 48.6% of the states $11.7 billion total commodity revenue 
(USDA 2009b).  At a national level, Illinois currently contributes an estimated 17.1% and 14.6% 
to the U.S. total value of production for corn and soybean respectively.  Illinois’ commodity 
contributions are primarily produced on flat rate rented cropland with current estimates of cash 
rented cropland ranging between 60%-80% of Illinois’ total cropland (Schnitkey and Lattz, 
2002).  Estimates from NASS 2007 Census data have produced figures as high as 73% for total 
Illinois cropland being cash rented.  During 2002, the Census of Agriculture (USDA, 2004) 
estimated only 69% of cropland was being cash rented, implying that approximately 765,891 
additional acres were being harvested by tenant farmers in 2007.  
The increase in cash rental contracts has come at the expense of other land transaction 
types.  Between 1996 and 2008, the prevalence of operators farming owned land decreased by 
nearly 9% and engagements in share leasing contracts dropped by 27.5%23
                                                          
2 General share leasing contracts consist of the tenant farmer and landowner entering into an agreement in which 
each party contributes equal value towards crop production and shares in the generated revenue at harvest.  Such 
contracts drastically reduce the risk faced by the tenant farmer by ensuring a consistent ratio between the input costs 
and generated revenues thereby stabilizing the farmer’s net income (Barry, 2000).  However, the risk faced by the 
landowner is increased relative to flat-rate cash rental arrangements given the variability in net returns. 
.  In 1992, it is 
estimated that share leasing contracts constituted around 70% of total leasing arrangements 
versus 45% in 2008.  Leasing contracts, in general, are considered beneficial given the relatively 
 
3 Figures obtained from FBFM data on share leased and cash rented acres. 
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small transaction costs in comparison to purchasing additional cropland and obtaining credit 
sources.  In previous years, the typical institutionalized share contracts across Illinois were 
viewed as optimal financing alternatives for farmers given the near perfect, positive correlation 
between the unknown harvest commodity price and the rental obligation to the landowner 
(Barry, 2000).  Despite this risk efficiency, it appears that both Illinois' farmers and landowners 
have tended to shy away from these agreements over recent years.     
Barry, Sotomayor and Moss (1998-99) cite several reasons for the movement to cash 
leases based on landowner and farm operator-driven incentives.  Amongst the items on their list 
are the avoidance of risk-sharing by the landowner, and ability to take advantage of high land 
prices to increase their income stream.  Incentives on the tenant farmer’s side include the 
simplification of leasing specifications, avoidance of management/marketing sharing, the ease of 
bidding for additional acreage and competition to gain additional cropland.     
With increasing cash rent agreements, Illinois has also experienced relatively large 
increases in cropland rent levels as seen in Figure 1.  According to USDA estimates, cash rents 
increased on average by 6.8% and 13.5% in 2007 and 2008, respectively.  The magnitude of 
these increases is much more apparent when comparing the average historical increases between 
1996-2005 at a mere 2.2% with the average rent per acre only $117.50.  The latest USDA reports 
show that 2008 cash rents topped $160 per acre on average in Illinois; the second highest rank 
for cash rents in the Corn Belt region falling only $5 short of Iowa cash rents.  Figure 2 provides 
a visual overview of cropland cash rents at the county level for Illinois as reported by 
USDA/NASS for 2008.  As shown, central counties in Illinois generally obtained greater cash 
rents for cropland.  The range of reported average rents range from a high of $224 per acre in 
Sangamon County to a low of $74.50 per acre in Perry County indicating the expected 
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heterogeneity across Illinois’ farmland.  However, anecdotal evidence and data report that 2008 
rents were being observed at unprecedented levels of $300-$400 per acre in key central Illinois' 
counties including Macon, McLean, Logan, Champaign and Tazewell.   
The observed increases in cash rents trend with actual cropland values with a state-wide 
average increase between 1996-2004 of 5.06% and an average value of $2,360 per acre.  
Following 2005, the yearly increases in cropland values began to average around 18.5% for 
Illinois ending at a historical high of $5,320 per acre in 2008 as shown in Figure 3.  Unlike the 
estimated cash rents, cropland values in Illinois are higher than any other state in the Corn Belt 
with Indiana trailing at $4,550 per acre (USDA, 2008a). 
 
2.2  Commodity Price Levels and Volatility 
The disturbance in relatively stable commodity prices during the past decade or so has been 
implicated for the large fluctuations seen in recent rental rates across Illinois (Schnitkey, 2007).  
Not only have the nominal levels reached all time highs, but the variability of grain prices has 
also increased (Irwin and Good, 2009).  
The source of commodity price disturbances can be attributed to several causes including 
population growth, urbanization, and the expansion of the middle class within developing 
countries.  Contractions in international grain supplies and depreciation of the U.S. dollar have 
compounded the demand pressures of commodities even further, effectively aiding in the rising 
prices of corn, soybean, wheat and other products (USDA, 2008c ; Irwin & Good, 2009; 
Muhammad & Kebede, 2009).  Perhaps a larger source of the abnormalities observed in today's 
commodity markets has come from that of U.S. government policies and mandates regarding 
renewable fuels.    
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The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 provided revisions for fuel quality which would 
require gasoline to contain an oxygenating additive resulting in cleaner burning and reduced air 
pollution beginning in 1995.  As stated in the legislation, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) began enforcing this condition with many refineries utilizing methyl tertiary-butyl ether 
(MTBE) as the required additive creating "reformulated gasoline", or RFG (U.S. EPA).  Studies 
later found MTBE to contaminate ground water and some states began banning its use including 
California (U.S. GAO, 2002).  The Energy Policy Act of 2005 later amended the Clean Air Act 
and added a new provision establishing the Renewable Fuel Standards program (RFS).   The 
RFS set forth the goal of producing 4 billion gallons of domestic ethanol in 2006 and 7.5 billion 
gallons of ethanol by 2012.  In addition, the EPA was charged with setting regulations by August 
2006 requiring that gasoline contain an average of 2.78% renewable fuels.  At the same time, the 
act also eliminated the 1995 fuel oxygenation requirement for RFG beginning May 5, 2006 and 
declined any liability protection for refineries who continued using MTBE as their choice 
renewable fuel additive.  This effectively left refineries with ethanol as the main alternative to 
produce RFG and comply with new EPA regulations (U.S. EPA, 2005; FTC, 2006; Gustafson, 
2008).  Following the implementation of the RFS in late summer 2006, U.S. farmers planted an 
estimated 93.5 million acres of corn going into the 2007 crop season according to NASS 
statistics.  This was a 19.4% increase over 2006 and the most corn planted since 1944 (USDA, 
2009c).  By the end of 2007, ethanol production had increased over 30% from the previous year 
using over 2.3 billion bushels of corn (Renewable Fuels Association, 2009a).  As a matter of 
comparison, only 1.4 billion bushels were used in ethanol production prior to the signing of the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005, implying a near 67% increase of corn as a feedstock in ethanol 
production alone.  Accordingly, the futures price of corn between the 2006 harvest and 2007 
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planting rose nearly 56% and continued to stay well above $3.50/bu for the majority of the year.  
As farmers produced historic volumes of corn, the amount of land used for soybean production 
and other commodities diminished, effectively lowering the supply of these food products and 
placing upward pressure on their prices as well (USDA, 2008c).   
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 amended the RFS of 2005 and 
expanded the original ethanol production goals (RFA, 2009b).  The new mandate sets to achieve 
an overall volume of 36 billion gallons of renewable fuels by 2022 with 15 billion gallons 
constituting ethanol and the rest coming from advanced and cellulosic biofuels (RFA, 2009b).  
By the end of 2008, it is estimated that over 9 billion gallons of ethanol were produced in the 
U.S. with approximately 3.4 billion bushels of corn used in the conversion process.  This was a 
near 40% increase in corn-ethanol conversion from 2007 and accounted for over 28% of U.S. 
total corn production.  In the coming years, it is expected that expansion within the ethanol 
industry will continue and nearly 35% of U.S. corn will go towards these initiatives (USDA, 
2008c).  USDA projects that by 2018, corn-based ethanol production will exceed 9% of annual 
gasoline consumption and ethanol demand alone will continue to put upward pressure on corn 
and other commodity prices. 
 
2.3  A New Era? 
Researchers believe that corn prices have become linked to that of the volatile energy markets 
through ethanol with energy value as the main driver for today’s corn prices, versus that of 
livestock feed value as in prior years (Irwin & Good, 2009; Muhammad & Kebede, 2009).  
Evidence indicates that traditional risks associated with grain markets, such as weather and 
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disease, are now being amplified by new sources of risk inherent in energy markets thus leading 
to the possibility for even greater volatility in commodity prices (Muhammed & Kebede, 2009).   
In addition to crop price volatility, it is also suggested that the level of commodity prices 
has entered a new era.  Irwin and Good (2009) compare the recent nominal changes of corn, 
soybean, and wheat prices to that of previous structural shifts.   Using historical commodity price 
changes as a road map, Irwin and Good predict that today’s new era will be characterized by 
average corn prices of $4.60 per bushel, with a predicted low of $3.00 per bushel and a high of 
$6.70 per bushel.  This is in comparison to the average corn price between 1974 through 2006 of 
only $2.42 as shown in Figure 4.   
Between current renewable fuel mandates and the prospect of crude oil rebounding up to 
$80 per barrel, experts expect corn prices will have sufficient support to maintain near the $4.00 
per bushel range in coming years (Irwin & Good, 2009; USDA, 2008c).  Researchers posit that 
the emergence of higher commodity price levels is the result of a new ‘floor’ being set by the 
implementation of minimum biofuel production goals (Muhammad & Kebede, 2009).  In the 
end, there is strong evidence to conclude that we have entered a new period of higher average 
prices and increased volatility.   
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2.4  Charts and Figures 
 
Figure 1. Increases in Illinois Agricultural Cash Rents, 1996-2008 
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Figure 2.  NASS Cash Rents for Illinois, 2008 
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Figure 3. Increases in Illinois Cropland Values, 1996-2008 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Nominal Monthly Farm Price of Corn in Illinois, January 1947 – January 2009 and 
Projected Future Range 
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Chapter 3  Land Rent Theories and Literature Review 
 
3.1  Classical Rent Theory 
One of the earliest classical explanations for the differences in land values and occurrence of rent 
is termed today as “Ricardian Rent Theory”.  This approach views the differences in rent as a 
function of the land’s inherent productivity where the residual profits of a tenant farmer are paid 
to the landowner for the use of real estate resources in the production process.  In his essay of 
1815, David Ricardo set the theory within the context of a newly settled country in which a small 
amount of only the most fertile lands, Type A, were used to cultivate commodities.  Type A 
lands have relatively low costs of production given their high productivity.  The small, fixed 
amount also ensures that all Type A land is claimed and used during initial production at 
settlement.  At this point, producers find it profitable to produce 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴1  units of output at a price 𝑃𝑃1 
and no rents are generated as depicted in Figure 5.  As the population of this newly developing 
country increases, the demand for agricultural goods raises, leading to increases of commodity 
prices and the need for additional land to be adopted for cultivation.  Given that the availability 
of Type A lands has been exhausted, Type B lands, which are inferior in terms of fertility, are 
adopted as cultivation sights.  The adoption of Type B land continues until the last parcel of land 
is used resulting in no rents being generated as was the case with Type A.  However, the price 
increases have resulted in a new profitability condition for Type A lands in which 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴2  units of 
output are now produced.  Residual profits are thus generated on Type A land which accrue to 
the landowner in the form of rent.  The cycle of increasing population, prices and the expansion 
of cultivated lands continues, bringing land types C, D into production.  As is the case with land 
of Type A and B, each successive land type earns a lower rent than its next productive 
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predecessor.  In the end, landowners with Land Type A will earn larger rent differentials than 
those of landowners with land of Type B, and so on.   
Prior to Ricardo publishing his work regarding land rents, James Anderson suggested a 
rather intuitive explanation for the existence of rents in his 1777 article “An Inquiry into the 
Nature of the Corn Laws, with a View to the Corn Bill Proposed for Scotland ” (Hubacek and 
Van den Bergh, 2002): 
"The farmer, however, who cultivates the rich spots, will be able to sell his corn 
at the same rate with those who occupy poorer fields; he will consequently, 
receive more than the intrinsic value of the corn he raises…It is this premium 
which we now call rent; a medium by which the expense of cultivating soils of 
different degrees of fertility is reduced to a perfect equality."   
This concept was later adopted by Ricardo in developing his land rent theory (Hubacek and Van 
den Bergh, 2002).  With competition amongst tenant farmers and free entry and exit within the 
agricultural sector, this ‘perfect equality’ in crop production expenses is ensured to be 
represented in the land rent structure.      
The evolution of economic land rent theory has also extended to use other land 
characteristics to explain differences in rents.  Another well known treatment of agricultural rents 
was developed by Johann Heinrich von Thünen in his book The Isolated State published in 1826.  
Von Thünen proposed that the distance to the terminal market drives rent differentials.  He 
argued that agricultural land use would form a concentric circle pattern around the terminal 
market representing differences in transportation costs.  The more perishable or bulky the good, 
the closer to the terminal market the land it was produced on would be.  This follows from the 
logic that the rent would be the value of the crop less production and transportation costs.  For 
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example, producers of highly perishable crops, which are not easily stored and become worthless 
once spoiled, would bid up the rent of the land near the terminal market creating the highest 
possible value for their commodity. Von Thünen complemented this suggestion with another 
view, rather from an intra-crop perspective.  Given a single type of crop, the same price will be 
received for that crop irrespective of where it was grown or the transportation costs imposed on 
the farmer.  Within a sub-concentric circle ring of crops, the lowest transportation cost to the city 
center will be the land at the inner most area of the sub-concentric ring.  Farmers will bid up the 
rent of this land trying to capitalize on the lower costs associated with it.  However, in the end, 
increases in rent price will offset the lower transportation costs.  This scenario will happen with 
every stratum within the sub-concentric circle, ensuring cost equality across all cropland parcels. 
While the strict assumptions made by von Thünen, such as a lack of geographic obstructions 
(rivers, mountains) and direct (straight line) transportation routes from the parcels to the city 
center, do not lend well to real world conditions, his interpretation gives important insight into 
the inherent spatial aspects of land rents. 
 
3.2  Neo-Classical Rent Theory4
Neo-classical economists began a different approach when introducing their perspectives on rent 
formation.  Mainly, they criticized the assumptions that land had no alternative use as imposed 
by classical economists.  Neo-classical economists also claimed that the classical approach 
ignored any associated opportunity costs.  They argued that lands could be transitioned to 
cultivate other commodities and therefore, the demand for land in producing a particular 
commodity would increase prices of other commodities since the prices of commodities are 
 
                                                          
4 Adapted from Hubacek and van den Bergh, 2002. 
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determined by supply and demand forces.  Rent was seen as the difference between the amount 
paid for the factor of production and the amount needed to keep the factor of production in its 
current use given other possible uses.  They concluded that rent was part of the production 
function and treated as such.   
Neoclassical theory also tends to lump together factors of production ignoring that land 
was a specialized production input and assuming it was substitutable.  As a result of the 
substitutability away from land and towards other factors of production, rent could be described 
as any other factor by means of its marginal product.  Within this definition, rent was computed 
through its shadow price and the additional value gained in a particular production process when 
land was increased marginally.  
 
3.3  Capitalized Values and Rate of Return 
Agricultural land can be viewed as an income generating asset.  Within this context, rent and 
land valuation phenomena can be viewed in a financial investment framework whereby the value 
is equated to the discounted future cash flows generated by the land.  Thus, the current land 
value (LV0) can formally be expressed by: 
(1) 𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝟎𝟎 = ∑ 𝑹𝑹𝒕𝒕(𝟏𝟏+𝒊𝒊)𝒕𝒕𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕=𝟏𝟏   , 
where R is the expected annual cash rent in period t, and i is the risk-free rate of interest.  In 
determining the expected rate of return for agricultural land, it is beneficial to consider the long-
run average of regional cash rents to land values (Dhyuvetter and Kastens, 2002).  Such a figure 
can be seen as the best guess of what one may expect as a yield (Dhyuvetter and Kastens, 2002).  
If this value represents the largest return given all other practical investments, then the land will 
be rented.  From this description, agricultural rent represents compensation that must be paid to 
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the landowner for the use of his/her scarce resource.  The tenant farmer will agree to pay 𝑅𝑅 
dollars in rent up until they are indifferent between renting and purchasing the property outright.  
Such an approach tends to follow that of the Neo-classical thought of how land rent values are 
generated. 
 
3.4  Empirical Land Rent Models 
3.4.1  Hedonic Approach 
The hedonic approach of analyzing land rents views the overall price of land parcels as being 
determined by market participants (landowners and tenant farmers).  However, with land parcels 
being a heterogeneous product, the valuation is not done in a straight-forward equilibrium setting 
of supply and demand.  Rather, the overall price of each parcel is determined by the summation 
and interaction of the ‘values’ of each underlying characteristic.  To further complicate matters, 
these individual characteristics do not technically have a market themselves given they cannot be 
separated from the parcel and sold as a separate product.  Thus, the hedonic approach of 
analyzing land rents takes the observed market price as given and determines how each inherent 
characteristic contributes to the overall value of the parcel. 
There have been very few recent studies focusing on agricultural cash rents, and 
applications of hedonic models to this area are scarce. Barry et. al (2000) develop a lease pricing 
model to determine equitable combinations of leasing arrangements (i.e. share rents, hybrid 
leases and cash leases) hypothesizing that the key foundation to leasing principles lies in the 
relationship between soil productivity, crop returns, and levels of share rent.  A hedonic 
approach is used to validate the premise that the share of crop returns attributable to farmland is 
directly related to soil productivity, a crop price index, and total acres owned amongst other 
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variables.  Through both cross-sectional and pooled analysis using Park's GLS methods, they 
find consistent, statistical evidence that soil productivity affects crop returns attributable to 
farmland while controlling for other potential variables of interest.  Forster et al. (2003) 
examined farm leasing markets in Ohio using survey data.  They use linear regression techniques 
to explain cash rents as a function of region, soil productivity and development pressures 
amongst other variables.  They find statistical evidence that nearby development places 
downward pressure on cash rents while soil productivity has an expected positive effect.  The 
authors cite several possible reasons for this occurrence including increased costs due to smaller 
parcels, difficulties in navigating bulky farming equipment on congested city roads, and lack of 
access to nearby farm-related services including grain elevators and seed suppliers. Kirwan 
(2009) employs a fixed effects model to farm level data from the U.S. Census of Agriculture 
Quin-quennial Census (1992 & 1997) to explore the effects of government subsidy payments on 
cash rents.   He finds statistical evidence that government subsidies increase cash rents by $0.21 
for each marginal subsidy dollar in contrast with theoretical arguments that nearly all of the 
marginal subsidy dollar will accrue to landowners.  
 
3.4.2  Income Approach 
The income approach of analyzing cash rents takes a more ‘Ricardian’ approach in that revenue 
and costs are explicitly modeled within the regression equation.  By contrast, the hedonic 
approach assumes that this step is embedded within the hedonic schedule of observed prices and 
subsequently does not model the difference in revenue and costs to explain rent levels.  In other 
words, the income approach explains rent as a function of residual rent, whereas the hedonic 
approach explains residual rent as a function of inherent parcel characteristics.   
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Featherstone and Baker (1988) estimate cash rents as a function of residual rent and time 
lagged rents.  These estimates are in turn used to estimate their respective land values.  They find 
that the current year's cash rent will increase by 8.1 cents in the short-run and 60.3 cents in the 
long-run for every dollar change in the prior year's residual rent.  However, the likely 
implications of endogeneity bias as a result of using lagged rents as an independent variable are 
not discussed.  Patten et al. (2008) also employ a rental estimator using expected net returns and 
subsidy payments while correcting for expectation bias through IV estimation and GMM 
techniques.   
Recognizing that agricultural rents likely contain a spatial component, Du, Hennessy and 
Edwards (2007) develop a variable profit function approach within a spatial framework to 
explore Iowa cash rents and their response to high corn prices.  Their study uses annual, county-
aggregated survey data and employs a spatial error autoregressive model while also controlling 
for temporal correlations within the disturbances.  Specifically, they find that cash rents 
increased by approximately $79 in the short run given a $1 increase in corn futures prices.  They 
also find that other choice variables have an impact on cash rents such as urbanization, adoption 
of genetically engineered crops, and distance from large metropolitan areas.  While not discussed 
in the paper, caution should be observed when interpreting the results of this study.  Given the 
theoretical base of the profit function used in the analysis, strict restrictions had to be imposed on 
the parameter estimates.  If these conditions constrained the estimator, such a modeling approach 
may not be appropriate and may be leading to artificial results. The profit function approach also 
explicitly models costs in the regression equation, making the calculated effects of increasing 
output prices truly "ceteris paribus".  This may produce results that are slightly misleading.  
Namely, it is very rare that output prices rise while input costs stay constant. 
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3.5  Empirical Land Value Models 
The farmland value literature is strongly correlated with the cropland cash rent literature.  Phipps 
(1984) concludes that residual returns, or rents, unidirectionally cause farmland values with 
farmland prices being determined within the farm sector.  In other words, agricultural rents 
determine the overall value of agricultural land, but land values do not determine rent levels.    
Awokuse (2006) finds that land price changes are sensitive to residual return fluctuations. 
Various empirical studies and extension reports use the Constant Discount Rate-Present Value 
Model (CDR-PVM) approach to model land values from a financial investment framework 
whereby the market value of land is equated to the discounted future cash rent flows generated 
by the land (Schnitkey, 2007; Moss, 1997; Robison, Lins, and VenKataraman, 1985; Veeman, 
Dong, and Veeman, 1993).  Other land value studies derive values through the implicit prices of 
heterogeneous land characteristics using a hedonic framework (Bastian et. al, 2002; Chicoine, 
1981; Shi, Phipps and Colyer, 1997; Palmquist 1989; Palmquist and Danielson 1989).  Huang et. 
al (2006) apply a spatial lag method to their hedonic model of Illinois farmland values using 
county-level, cross-sectional time-series data.  They find that the inclusion of spatial and serial 
components substantially improve their model fit.  Statistical evidence from this study suggests 
that parcel size, urbanization, and soil productivity have significant impacts on farmland values.  
These findings coincide with those in the farmland rent literature reinforcing the idea of a strong 
relationship between land values and land rents. 
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3.6  Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Ricardo’s Approach to Differences in Land Rents Resulting from Productivity 
Differences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Barlowe 1986 
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Chapter 4  Theoretical Framework 
 
4.1  Hedonic Model 
Assuming a competitive market and homogenous goods, prices are determined by supply and 
demand.  If goods within a market are not homogenous, however, the supply and demand model 
must be augmented to allow for market pricing of the good’s various underlying attributes.  A 
hedonic model allows for the analysis of such heterogeneous commodities by depicting the 
relationship between the price of a composite good and its individual attributes, facilitating the 
estimation of each characteristic's implicit price and contribution to the overall market value of 
the "bundled" good (Palmquist, 1989).   Within the context of cropland cash rents, the hedonic 
framework suggests that the equilibrium rent per acre, 𝑅𝑅(𝑧𝑧), is a manifestation of those 
individual attributes into a single price.  The relationship can be represented by the hedonic 
equation 
 (2) 𝑹𝑹 = 𝑹𝑹(𝒛𝒛𝟏𝟏, … . . , 𝒛𝒛𝒏𝒏), 
where 𝑅𝑅 is the rental price of the parcel per acre, and 𝑧𝑧 = (𝑧𝑧1, … . . , 𝑧𝑧𝑛𝑛) is a vector of 𝑛𝑛 unique 
characteristics of the land (Palmquist, 1989).  The implicit price of each characteristic 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖  can then 
be calculated as the partial derivative of the hedonic equation with respect to that particular 
characteristic5
(3) 𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴(𝒛𝒛𝒊𝒊) = 𝝏𝝏𝑹𝑹𝝏𝝏𝒛𝒛𝒊𝒊   
: 
The hedonic approach, developed in the work of Lancaster (1966, 1971), Rosen (1974), 
amongst others, has been extensively employed in the study of housing values (Can, 1990; 
                                                          
5 This general framework assumes each underlying attribute of the good is valued by agent’s independently from 
other characteristics.  This assumption can be modified by the addition of interaction terms within the model in 
which case the implicit price derivation would need to be modified accordingly. 
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Olmo, 1995; Benjamin and Sirmans, 1996; Palmquist, Roka and Vukina, 1997; Basu and 
Thibodeau, 1998; Luttik, 2000; Downes and Zabel, 2002; Nelson, 2004; Pope, 2008), 
housing/office rent values (Guntermann and Norrbin, 1987; Dunse and Jones, 1998; Bollinger, 
1998; Smith and Islam, 1998; Valente et. al, 2005; Löchl, 2007), and agricultural land values 
(Bastian et. al 2002, Chicoine 1981, Shi, Phipps, Colyer, 1997; Palmquist, 1989; Palmquist and 
Danielson, 1989; Huang et. al, 2006).  However, its use in analyzing agricultural cash rents is 
disparate. 
As indicated by land rent theory and adopted by the literature, characteristics such as soil 
fertility, climate and location/distance to the terminal market are important attributes which 
collectively help determine the value of the land to production.  The output price for 
commodities produced on the land is proportional to the revenues generated by the land.  
Commodity prices can then be considered as an attribute of the land to be estimated.  This is 
especially true to the extent that cash prices may differ by location from some basis spread 
creating another heterogeneous characteristic.  As a last consideration, the characteristics of the 
tenant farmer may have a common impact on cash rents and should be included in the hedonic 
model.  While it is possible to observe and collect information on soil productivity, ruralness, 
and commodity price measures, a proxy for the tenant farmer's ability may not be available at 
which point this will be absorbed by the error component of the hedonic model, 𝜀𝜀.  This suggests 
that perhaps a hedonic model of agricultural rents would be best suited within a random effects 
panel framework.  The above discussion implies that the hedonic model to be estimated takes the 
form: 
 (4) 𝑹𝑹 = 𝜶𝜶 + 𝑿𝑿𝑿𝑿 + 𝒁𝒁𝒁𝒁 + 𝑾𝑾𝑾𝑾 + 𝜺𝜺     
26 
 
where 𝑋𝑋 is a matrix of physical land characteristics, 𝑍𝑍 a matrix of local characteristics, and 𝑊𝑊 a 
matrix of economic characteristics.  The parameters 𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽, 𝛾𝛾 and 𝛿𝛿 are all to be estimated, where 𝜀𝜀 
is considered for further decomposition to allow for heterogeneity across parcels. 
 
4.2  Spatial Considerations 
Previous research indicates that the process by which land values and cash rents are generated 
likely exhibit spatial effects (Anselin, 1992; Du, Hennessy and Edwards, 2007; Du, Hennessy 
and Edwards, 2008; Huang et. al, 2006; Soto, 2004).  In general, data that are close together in a 
spatial aspect are likely to be spatially correlated to some extent (Benirschka and Binkley, 1994).     
Spatial autocorrelation, otherwise known as spatial dependence, can be defined as the 
correlation between the distribution of a variable and its location (Anselin and Bera, 1998).  For 
positive spatial autocorrelation, high or low values of a random variable exhibit apparent spatial 
clustering.  As the correlation between agents or economic units increase, we expect there to be a 
loss of information as the sample we are using for statistical correlation and inference is no 
longer a true random draw. 
Formally, spatial autocorrelation can be expressed by the moment condition:  
(5) 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪�𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊,𝒚𝒚𝒋𝒋� = 𝑬𝑬�𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊,𝒚𝒚𝒋𝒋� − 𝑬𝑬[𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊] ∗ 𝑬𝑬�𝒚𝒚𝒋𝒋� ≠ 𝟎𝟎 𝒇𝒇𝑪𝑪𝒇𝒇 𝒊𝒊 ≠ 𝒋𝒋  , 
where 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 are individual units (counties, farming operations, markets ect.) and  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  and 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗  are 
the values of a random variable in space.  It should be noted that there is nothing necessarily 
spatial with a non-zero covariance.  However, in light of a spatial structure, interaction or 
arrangement of units, the pairs 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 develop a meaningful spatial interpretation (Anselin and 
Bera, 1998).  The correlation between units causes OLS to no longer be the best linear unbiased 
estimator yielding biased coefficient estimates, downward bias variance estimates, or both 
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(Anselin, 1992).6
To detect spatial correlation, simple preliminary steps can be taken such as visually 
inspecting the data through GIS software mapping techniques and observing spatial patterns.  A 
more formal approach to detecting spatial correlations is known as the Moran’s I test which is 
used to determine whether neighboring areas are more similar than would be expected under the 
null hypothesis of spatial independence.  The test statistic of the Moran’s I is computed as 
follows:  
  In the case where the variances are estimated as smaller than the truth, the 
corresponding coefficients may appear to be statistically significant when, in fact, they are not.  
As stated by Anselin (2002),  "The main objective of the econometric exercise is to obtain 
unbiased/consistent and efficient estimates for the regression parameters in the model (β), while 
taking into account the spatial structure incorporated in the error covariance matrix."  
(6) 𝑴𝑴 = 𝑵𝑵
∑ ∑ 𝒘𝒘𝒊𝒊𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒊𝒊
∗
∑ ∑ 𝒘𝒘𝒊𝒊𝒋𝒋�𝒀𝒀𝒊𝒊−𝒀𝒀�(𝒀𝒀𝒋𝒋−𝒀𝒀�)𝒋𝒋𝒊𝒊
∑ (𝒊𝒊 𝒀𝒀𝒊𝒊−𝒀𝒀�)   , 
where 𝑁𝑁 is the number of spatial units indexed by 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗, 𝑌𝑌 is the dependent variable, and 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  is 
a weight matrix defining the relationship between observations and will be discussed in more 
detail shortly.  The Moran's I is a weighted correlation coefficient to detect departures from 
spatial randomness (Anselin, 1992). Values of the Moran's I fall between −1 ≤ 𝐼𝐼 ≤ 1, with −1 
indicating perfect spatial dispersion, 1 perfect spatial correlation and near zero implying a 
random spatial pattern.   
 
 
                                                          
6 In the case where the dependent variable exhibits spatial correlation with its neighboring values and is considered 
only a function of those lagged dependent values, resulting parameter estimates will be biased when applying OLS.  
In the case that the spatially correlated dependent variable is found to be a function of independent variables plus 
some spatially correlated error term, the estimated variances of the parameters will be downward bias, but the 
parameters estimates themselves will remain unbiased.  
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4.2.1  Weight Matrix 
The weights matrix is simply an exogenous structural element which defines the spatial 
relationship between observations.  This structure allows researchers to implement testing for 
spatial correlations as well as correction techniques during the estimation process to explicitly 
model spatial correlations (these techniques are discussed in the next section).  While it would be 
optimal to estimate the connectedness between each spatial unit by using a complete variance-
covariance matrix, structure must be imposed in order for testing and estimation to be feasible 
(Anselin, 1992).  By construction, the weights matrix allows for individual units to be correlated 
with contiguous or distance defined neighboring units.  As a result, all units are indirectly 
correlated with the interaction dissipating as the distance between units grows.  This captures the 
essential feature of geographical systems in that nearness matters and those economic units 
closest to you should have the largest effect, declining as distance between neighbors increases.  
Defining a weight matrix is central to addressing the implications of spatial correlation.  
Unfortunately, tests do not exist to define the "correct" weighting scheme for a particular process 
and this decision is ultimately left up to the researcher.  Weighting structures commonly used in 
applied research include contiguity matrices (rook and queen), k-nearest neighbors, and distance 
decay functions (Anselin, 1992).  In the case where the data do not include specific borders or 
latitude-longitude coordinates, the lesser known block weights matrix can be used in which units 
that belong to a larger system are considered neighbors (Anselin, 2002).  This is a hierarchical 
spatial structure which adheres to the standard assumption that choices are influenced by the 
behavior of others in their immediate vicinity (Case, 1992).  The properties of this weighting 
scheme make the block structure a very attractive option in modeling the effects of neighbors on 
individual farmers.  In the case of agricultural producers, this structure may help depict the 
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spatial correlation of choices such as the adoption of new hybrid seeds, chemical pest control and 
the extent to which farmers have been educated on the adoption of new technologies. Similarly, 
the county-level weights matrix may reflect county-level rules, such as property-taxes, that might 
commonly affect their residents.  These examples may indirectly affect rent levels paid by tenant 
farmers by impacting overall revenue levels.  However, empirical use of this structure deems that 
caution be taken given the inherent side-effects.  Since each weight is expressed as 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1/𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 , 
where nc denotes the number of farmers in county c, the neighbor effect will tend to zero as 
𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 → ∞.    
Depending on the specified structure, the observations are assigned a "neighborhood set" 
represented by an 𝑁𝑁 𝑥𝑥 𝑁𝑁 positive weight matrix.  For each observation 𝑖𝑖, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  defines 𝑗𝑗 as a 
neighbor with a non-zero entry in row 𝑖𝑖 and column 𝑗𝑗.  The matrices are typically row 
standardized such that:   
(7) 𝒘𝒘𝒊𝒊𝒋𝒋𝒔𝒔 = 𝒘𝒘𝒊𝒊𝒋𝒋∑ 𝒘𝒘𝒊𝒊𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋   , 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0 representing that an economic unit cannot be a neighbor of itself.   
In the case of the Moran’s I test statistic, this neighbor structure allows for the matrix 
multiplication of the weight matrix and a vector of independent variables resulting in a matrix of 
neighbor-weighted average values for each observation.  The use of the weights matrix extends 
beyond the simple identification of spatial correlations and is also used in explicitly accounting 
for spatial relationships in the data.    
 
4.3  Spatial Autoregressive Models (SAR) 
Two main models are generally employed to explicitly model spatial interactions; the spatial lag 
and the spatial error model.  The spatial lag model assumes that the dependent variable is a 
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function of independent variables plus its neighbors spatially weighted (lagged) observations and 
a normally behaved error component.  In comparison, the spatial error model assumes the 
dependent observation is a function of exogenous independent variables plus a non-normal error 
term in which the individual disturbances are spatially correlated with each other.     
While the spatial lag specification tends to result from theory such as resource 
competition or spillover effects, the spatial error model is typically used to contend with data 
"problems" (Anselin, 1992).  The spatial error model is a special case of a so-called non-
spherical error model where the OLS assumptions of homoskedastic and uncorrelated errors are 
violated (Anselin, 1992).  Following is a brief overview of the theoretical construction of the 
spatial error model within a panel data context where the cross-sectional errors show systematic 
spatial patterns. 
Consider a simple pooled linear regression model where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … . ,𝑁𝑁 denotes the cross-
sectional dimension, 𝑡𝑡 = 1, … . ,𝑇𝑇 denotes the time dimension and observations are stacked as 
successive cross-sections for each time period: 
(8) 𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 = 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 + 𝒖𝒖𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕  , 
where y is an 𝑁𝑁 𝑥𝑥 1 vector of observations on the dependent variable, x is an 𝑁𝑁 𝑥𝑥 𝑘𝑘 matrix of 
observations on the explanatory variables, β is a 𝑘𝑘 𝑥𝑥 1 vector of regression coefficients, and u is 
an 𝑁𝑁 𝑥𝑥 1 vector of error terms.  Further, let u be defined as a first order spatial autoregressive 
process: 
(9) 𝒖𝒖𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 = 𝝆𝝆𝑾𝑾𝒖𝒖𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 , 
Where 𝜌𝜌 is a scalar denoting the magnitude of correlation, otherwise known as a spatial 
autocorrelation coefficient or nuisance parameter, W is the previously described weight matrix 
and 𝜀𝜀 is a vector of innovations with a mean of zero and constant variance 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2.  The error 
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structure in this statistical model represents all of the unexplained factors not captured by the 
explanatory variables and allows for the spatial connectedness between observations to be 
accounted for effectively removing the correlation.  This concept is similar to that employed in 
time series applications.  In a spatial context, nuisance correlations within this specification are 
modeled using the so-called "spatial filter" approach by rewriting equation (8) as: 
(10) 𝒖𝒖𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 = (𝑴𝑴 − 𝝆𝝆𝑾𝑾)−𝟏𝟏𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕  , 
resulting in the panel model: 
(11) 𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 = 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 + (𝑴𝑴 − 𝝆𝝆𝑾𝑾)−𝟏𝟏𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕  ,   
where (𝐼𝐼 − 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊)−1 is the spatial filter, and I is an identity matrix with ones along the main 
diagonal.  The resulting error covariance is: 
(12) 𝑬𝑬[𝜺𝜺𝜺𝜺′ ] = 𝝈𝝈𝟐𝟐(𝑴𝑴 − 𝝆𝝆𝑾𝑾)−𝟏𝟏(𝑴𝑴 − 𝝆𝝆𝑾𝑾′)−𝟏𝟏 = 𝝈𝝈𝟐𝟐[(𝑴𝑴 − 𝝆𝝆𝑾𝑾)′(𝑴𝑴 − 𝝆𝝆𝑾𝑾)]−𝟏𝟏  , 
in which the magnitude of connectedness between units readily decreases as contiguity is 
exhausted. By rewriting equation (11), it is easily shown that the panel model could successfully 
be estimated by OLS using spatially filtered dependent and explanatory variables (Anselin 
1992): 
(13) 𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕(𝑴𝑴 − 𝝆𝝆𝑾𝑾) = 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿(𝑴𝑴 − 𝝆𝝆𝑾𝑾) + 𝒖𝒖𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕  , 
or equivalently, 
(14) 𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 − 𝝆𝝆𝑾𝑾𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 = 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 − 𝝆𝝆𝑾𝑾𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 + 𝒖𝒖𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕  , 
where Wy and Wx are the spatially weighted average of the lagged dependent and independent 
variables and u is a well behaved error term following classical linear regression assumptions.  
However, as noted by Anselin (1992), the correlation coefficient 𝝆𝝆 is rarely, if ever, known and 
must be jointly estimated with the regression coefficients (Anselin, 1992).  With such a 
possibility ruled out, estimation must rely on the specification in equation (11). 
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If the error at each location depends on the errors at other locations, the expectation is 
that 𝜌𝜌 > 0, implying that the errors are correlated within a spatial structure. In this case, the 
classic assumptions of homoskedastic and uncorrelated errors are not satisfied. Of course, if 
𝜌𝜌 = 0, then the model results in a typical pooled panel analysis with uncorrelated disturbances 
across units.  By explicitly modeling the possible presence of spatially autocorrelated error terms 
within the data, efficient estimates can be generated and statistical inference carried out.   
The modeling of non-spherical models requires special attention as described above, and 
also gives rise to additional provisions.  Namely, the standard R2 measure is no longer applicable 
and substitutions must be implemented.  As suggested by Anselin (1992b), there are two pseudo-
R2 statistics that can be used as alternatives with the first simply being the ratio of the predicted 
value variances and the observed value variances: 
(15) 𝑹𝑹�𝟐𝟐 = 𝝈𝝈𝒑𝒑𝒇𝒇𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊𝒑𝒑𝒕𝒕𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝟐𝟐
𝝈𝝈𝑪𝑪𝒐𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒑𝒑𝒇𝒇𝑪𝑪𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑
𝟐𝟐  
The second model fit uses the squared correlation between the predicted and observed values: 
(16) 𝑹𝑹�𝟐𝟐 = 𝒑𝒑𝑪𝑪𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇(𝒚𝒚,𝒚𝒚�)𝟐𝟐 
Both measures will be provided in this study to give an approximate range for the fit of the 
overall model. 
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Chapter 5  Data, Methods and Procedures 
 
5.1  Data  
This study employs certified farm level data from the Illinois Farm Bureau Farm Management 
Association (FBFM) in conjunction with NASS county corn yield data and CBOT corn futures 
price data to model farmland rents.  The FBFM data span the years 1996 through 2008, and 
contain over 5,000 participating farmers.  FBFM data provide information on cash rents, Soil 
Productivity Ratings (SPR), annual production costs (seed, fertilizer, fuel & oil), the farmer’s 
county, total number of operator acres, tillable and cash rented acres, as well as annual yields for 
each farmer. 
While this study is mainly interested in using farm-level data to explore commodity price 
level effects on cash rents, a county-level analysis is also included as a matter of comparison.  
The observations used in the farm-level analysis were limited to only those records containing 
data for all thirteen years, resulting in a balanced panel.  To construct the county-level data, the 
farm data was generated into a weighted average of rent values by the acreage cash rented.7  The 
observations were allowed to contain farmers who did not have a complete thirteen year profile; 
however, the counties themselves were required to have thirteen years of continuous 
observations. Cash rents reported as negative or zero and farms with a zero SPR were also 
excluded, as well as those who reported cash rent, but had zero cash rented acres or zero operator 
acres.8
                                                          
7 The weighting process is described in the next section. 
  The resulting farm level data includes 408 individual farmers and the county weighted 
8 In order to account for outliers, each county was looked at individually as well as each year within the county.  An 
observation was deemed an outlier if the observed rent was three times the interquartile range of the sub data 
resulting from the county and year.  This is generally considered a conservative approach when dealing with outliers 
according to statisticians.  Discussions with FBFM staff indicated that rents in excess of $600 per acre—those 
observations which were excluded—were most likely the result of data collection errors. 
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data consists of 78 of Illinois’102 counties per cross-section.  Table 1 and 2 provide summary 
statistics for both data sets. 
 
5.2  Variables Used in the Hedonic Rent Model  
5.2.1  Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for each analysis is cash rent per tillable cash rented acre as reported by 
the FBFM.9
(17) ∑ [𝒇𝒇𝒑𝒑𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊∗𝒇𝒇𝒑𝒑𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑 𝒂𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒇𝒇𝒑𝒑𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒊]𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏
∑ 𝒇𝒇𝒑𝒑𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑 𝒂𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒇𝒇𝒑𝒑𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒊𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏  ∀ 𝒋𝒋, 
  While the farm-level rent is the actual value reported in the FBFM data, the county 
level was constructed via the farm-level data through a weighted aggregation process as follows: 
where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … . ,𝑛𝑛 is the individual farmer in county 𝑗𝑗.   
 
5.2.2  Independent Variables 
The parcel characteristics considered in the analysis are expected corn yield, expected corn price, 
intra-county soil productivity differences, crop yield risk, urbanization pressures and the total 
amount of operator acreage.  Table 3 provides a brief description of the characteristics and 
expected signs.  Since the form of inflation most relevant to farmers is the cost of their inputs, all 
price measures (including the dependent variable) are adjusted to 2008 dollars using a (county) 
farmer specific producer price index based on (weighted) non-land costs.10
                                                          
9 All contract data used are standard fixed rate rental agreements and share rents or hybrid contracts were explicitly 
excluded. FBFM differentiates between these leasing types allowing us to specifically study only cash rent 
arrangements. 
  Thus, all coefficients 
will be in real terms. 
10 As the FBFM data consists of extensive cost data include fertilizer, seed, pesticide and fuel & oil, we seen it fit to 
create unique producer price indices for each farmer (county) to capitalize on the additional information gained from 
modeling actual cost structures.  This is in comparison to using a very generic PPI as supplied by the BLS.  A 2008-
base index was created for each farmer (county) given their individual (weighted) costs over time on a per acre basis 
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The primary objective of this paper is to examine how rents are impacted by changing 
output prices and how these higher prices are allocated amongst tenant farmers, landowners and 
input suppliers.  In deciding on an appropriate proxy for corn prices in terms of futures prices, 
we assume farmers typically enter into rental agreements prior to the next year's cropping season.  
PRICE is thus defined as the average settlement for corn futures in November for the far 
December contract. The public nature, wide accessibility and reliance of futures markets by 
commodity producers is seen to represent the best available information (at the time a rental 
contract is signed) for the expected price of the crop received by the farmer.  For example, when 
modeling the rent contract for the 2008 harvest season, we assume the farmer will use the futures 
price observed in November 2007 for the contract ending in December 2008.   
A stylized fact throughout rural land literature is that soil productivity is a main driver of 
farmland values and rents.  A yield variable, ExpYield is included as an inter-county measure of 
productivity across Illinois farms.  A majority, if not all, cropland rental analyses include some 
measure of the lands productive capacity whether it be a soil productivity rating (Barry et. al, 
2000), a corn suitability rating (Du, Hennessy, and Edwards, 2007), simulated yield potentials 
(Kurkalova, Burkart, and Secchi, 2004), or qualitative land class categories based on yield ranges 
(Forster et. al, 2003).  This study takes advantage of detrended county corn yields using data 
from 1979 through 2008 as a proxy of the land’s natural capacity to cultivate commodities.  Such 
a measure is seen to be an accurate proxy for inter-county land productivity versus a more 
conventional measure, such as SPR, which assigns an index number based on individual soil 
types.  For example, a particular silt loam soil may have an SPR of 75 on a scale of 100 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
as to account for a relative aspect.  The unique index was then used a sort of deflator for prices over time (rents and 
futures prices).  This structure also has the added benefit of creating cross-sectional variations in the futures price to 
proxy a basis structure that would be observed across individual markets. 
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indicating that the soil is relatively productive.  However, silt loam in a central Illinois' county 
may produce drastically different yields than the same silt loam in a southern county as a result 
of differing environmental conditions.  By using detrended yields, productivity differences 
across counties are more effectively captured as the erroneous similarities in productivity 
between two entirely different soil capacities are removed.  It is expected that higher county 
yields will have a positive effect on cash rents within that county given the intuition that parcels 
which produce more bushels per acre (resulting in greater revenues) must be compensated for 
through higher rental rates. Graphical representations of the expected yields used in this study 
are presented in Figure 6.  As shown, central counties in Illinois tend to have higher yields, with 
McDounough County having the highest expected yield of approximately 181 bushels of corn 
per acre.  Moving towards southern Illinois, yields tend to decrease with Perry County 
representing the lowest yielding county in Illinois at approximately 106 bushels per acre.  Note 
that the pattern of high (low) crop yields nearly mirrors that of high (low) cash rents as seen in 
Figure 2. 
To capture farm-specific productivity, FtoCSPR is defined as the proportion of the 
farmer-specific SPR, as provided by FBFM, to the county average SPR.  For example, take a 
county that has an average SPR of 80.  When a tenant farmer is observed with a tract of land that 
has an SPR of 90, we would expect this to plot to be "worth" more than the neighbor's average 
plot.  Controlling for intra-county variations will aid in the examination of heterogeneous 
cropland within counties and the corresponding cash rent.   
As documented in Barry et. al (2000), cash rents include a risk premium which is 
reflected in the rent price paid by tenant farmers to landowners.  This is due to the fact that, 
unlike share rent agreements, the tenant farmer bears all yield, price and marketing risks.  CV is 
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included to capture the yield risk bourn onto the tenant farmer being defined as the normalized 
measure of dispersion constructed from the probability distribution of individual county 
historical yields, and is calculated as follows: 
 (18) 𝑪𝑪𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕 = 𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕𝝁𝝁𝒕𝒕 , 
where 𝜎𝜎 is the standard deviation for the historical detrended yields up to time 𝑡𝑡 and 𝜇𝜇 is the 
expected detrended yield at time 𝑡𝑡.  The yield risk is updated every year within the panel to 
simulate the tenant farmers current knowledge at time 𝑡𝑡 and thus is a changing expectation of 
yield risk based on data that would have been available to the farmer through time.  In other 
words, the construction of CV takes into consideration that the perceived yield risk to a farmer 
will change over time with the accumulation of additional information as more history is 
“observed” of the estimated amount of yield risk faced.  For example, consider a tenant farmer 
negotiating his/her rental rate for the 1997 crop year.  At that point in time, the farmer has 
historical yield information from 1979 through 1996 and is able to construct both an expected 
yield from the rented land and the spread of the historical yield distribution (i.e., yield risk).  
When this same farmer begins rent negotiations for 2007, they will have ten additional years of 
yield data in which to construct expectations.  We expect that as historical yield risk increases, 
the rental rate per acre will fall given the likely assumption that farmer’s are risk averse and will 
take into account the perceived risk of yield variations during rental agreements. 
Previous literature also includes some measure of urban/development pressures on land 
rents.  Urban pressures can change the opportunity costs of land on the fringes of expanding 
cities, thus increasing the market price of rented land.  Previous measures of urbanization used in 
empirical studies include respondent survey perceptions of development pressures, county 
normalized distance from major metropolitan areas and the USDA-ERS Beale Rural-Urban 
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Continuum Code (Forster et. al, 2003; Du, Hennessy, and Edwards, 2007; Huang et. al, 2006).  
This study uses the percent of total county acres used for planting purposes, including corn, 
soybean and wheat as a proxy.  The data on planted acres was obtained through NASS, which 
reports yearly acreage uses across Illinois counties.  As measures such as the Beale Code and 
distances to metropolitan areas tend to remain static through the panel data, this proxy 
construction will allow for the urbanization pressures of a county to change through time.   
Figure 4 provides a visual representation of county urbanization pressures depicted as 
“ruralness”.  The most urban area, according to the proxy variable, is Williamson County in 
Southern Illinois with only 15.1% of its land used for cultivation of major crops.  According to 
U.S. Census figures, Williamson County is rapidly growing giving additional credibility to this 
proxy measure for urbanization.  Other counties deemed as relatively urban include Peoria as 
well as Kane, Will, and McHenry counties which border Chicago's Cook County.  The most 
rural county is Piatt, which also has one of the highest county corn yields.  Other counties seen as 
rural include other high yielding counties such as DeKalb, Stark, Livingston, Iroquois, Ford and 
Logan.    
There are conflicting expectations for how development pressures influence farmland 
rental rates and it is important that there be a distinction between cropland rents and cropland 
values.  While it is generally accepted and expected that land values will naturally be higher in 
more populated areas for a variety of reasons, there is no reason to expect that the corresponding 
land rents will also be higher.  Downward pressure on cropland rental markets in highly 
populated areas may be expected due to several factors.  Parcel sizes would likely be smaller as 
land is allocated for residential or commercial purposes inhibiting economies of scale/scope and 
increasing transportation costs between multiple parcels.  Accessibility to both land and farming 
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materials would be hindered as routes to the parcels would likely become more indirect (new 
roadways being formed to serve new residential/business areas) and as non-farm neighbors 
become the majority extinguishing the need for grain mills and farm-related input suppliers.  
Also, highly congested areas would cause difficulties when moving bulky farming equipment 
and parcels may be more exposed to major traffic veins leaving crops vulnerable to 
car/factory/household pollution adversely affecting crops.  These factors may decrease the 
competition for parcels in highly urbanized areas resulting in lower rental rates.  On the other 
hand, if a parcel is highly productive, the rent for the parcel may be pushed up as the tenant 
farmer bids the parcel away from its next best residential/commercial use.   
The last variable considered is a farmer's total operator acres as reported by FBFM.  We 
hypothesize that larger operations would indicate economies of scale implying the ability to 
outbid competing, less cost efficient farmers and inflate rental rates.  In this sense, the variable 
OpAcre can be seen to capture the tenant farmer's ability to some extent given that more efficient 
(skilled) farmer's will have the cost structure to acquire additional land through outbidding less 
skilled, less efficient farmers.   
 
5.3  Assumptions 
Some data limitations should be noted.  Although a majority of cash leases are renegotiated 
yearly, the length of the contract is ultimately unknown.  This missing information could cause 
issues when analyzing rents as the observed figures would not be the best indicator of how the 
market views the various attributes of the land from one year to the next.  The actual timing of 
the lease signing is also unknown.  However, according to previous studies using survey data 
reports from farmers and landowners, it appears that assuming the contracts are signed yearly in 
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late fall is an acceptable assumption.  In addition, it is likely that some reported rentals are ones 
in which the landowner rents directly to a family member.  Such circumstances are unlikely to 
reflect the true market value of the hedonic characteristics.  However, there is anecdotal evidence 
that share rents and hybrid agreements are favored among family rental situations leading to the 
conclusion that the data used in this analysis is not overcast with such perplexities (Forster et. al, 
2003).   
To help determine if the above issues severely impact the rental observations used in this 
article, Table 4 supplies yearly average cropland cash rents reported by NASS and compares 
them to our yearly average county and farm level data.  The NASS estimates and rental figures 
originating from the FBFM are very similar in magnitude and tend to trend together throughout 
the years of observation.  This evidence suggests that the FBFM data is representative as 
compared to yearly NASS estimates.  
 
5.4  Empirical Model11
This paper takes advantage of a novel econometric approach to examine agricultural cash rents 
which explicitly takes into account 1) spatial correlation structures between farming units; 2) 
temporal correlations due to time-lagged behaviors when establishing cash rents; and 3) 
individual heterogeneity across farming units.
  
12
                                                          
11 Special thanks to Gianfranco Piras for developing the implementation of the spatial panel error component model 
in R.  Without this, the following estimations would not be possible. 
  Figure 2 presented preliminary visual evidence 
as to the postulated spatial structure present in the data.  As shown, there is apparent spatial 
clustering with the higher rents, depicted in dark red, and lower rents, shown by dark and light 
orange.  To formally test the presence of spatial correlations within the data, a Moran’s I test is 
12 The model is adapted from Kapoor et al. 2007. 
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conducted for each year and reported in Table 5.13  Consistent and positive spatial correlations 
are observed for both data sets.  A Joint LM test with H0: No spatial dependence, random effects, 
or serial correlation, was rejected at the .01% level of significance as was a Conditional LM test 
with H0: No spatial dependence given random effects and serial correlation.14
The resulting specification follows a typical spatial error process as described extensively 
in the spatial econometric literature and integrates additional error assumptions often used in the 
error component literature.
  It is concluded 
that the hypothesized spatial correlation in the data is reasonably validated and that a random 
effects spatial-temporal panel regression method is warranted. 
15
(19) 𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 = 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 + 𝒖𝒖𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕, 
   A generalized spatial panel data model that demonstrates these 
specifications is given as follows:  
where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … . ,𝑁𝑁 is the cross-sectional index and 𝑡𝑡 = 1, … . ,𝑇𝑇 is the index for the time 
dimension.  With interest focused on the spatial effects, the observations are stacked as 
consecutive cross sections with 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  an N x 1 vector of cross-sectional observations for period 𝑡𝑡, 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  
an N x K matrix of exogenous variables, 𝛽𝛽 a K x 1 vector of corresponding regression 
coefficients and 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡  an N x 1 vector of disturbance terms.  As commonly documented in the 
spatial econometric literature (Anselin, 2002), a first order spatial autoregressive process is then 
used to describe the disturbance structure as:   
                                                          
13 A block matrix was used for the farm data while a queen-contiguity matrix was used for the county data.  
Different weighting schemes were used for the county data and did not show a significant difference in the results. 
14 Spatial panel tests used in this paper are created by Gianfranco Piras and available in the SPLM package for R. 
15 See Baltagi 2008 for a complete treatment of the one-way error component model. 
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 (20) 𝒖𝒖𝒕𝒕 = 𝝆𝝆𝑾𝑾𝒖𝒖𝒕𝒕 + 𝜺𝜺𝒕𝒕  , 
where 𝜌𝜌 is a scalar representing the spatial autoregressive parameter, 𝑊𝑊 is the N x N time 
invariant spatial weights matrix and 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  is an N x 1 vector of innovations.  Similar to a shift 
operator used in time series analysis (e.g. 𝑡𝑡 − 1), spatial econometrics constructs the so-called 
"spatial lag operator", a new variable consisting of the weighted averages of neighboring 
observations as specified through the weights matrix.  Stacking the observations in the panel, the 
vector of spatially lagged error terms for the above equation is as follows: 
(21) 𝑾𝑾𝒖𝒖𝑵𝑵 = (𝑴𝑴𝑻𝑻⨂𝑾𝑾𝑵𝑵)𝒖𝒖𝑵𝑵 , 
with 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇  an identity matrix with dimension 𝑇𝑇.  The disturbance process can be rewritten in stacked 
notation as: 
(22) 𝒖𝒖𝑵𝑵 = 𝝆𝝆(𝑴𝑴𝑻𝑻⨂𝑾𝑾𝑵𝑵)𝒖𝒖𝑵𝑵 + 𝜺𝜺𝑵𝑵, 
or, 
(23) 𝒖𝒖𝑵𝑵 = (𝑴𝑴𝑻𝑻⨂𝑩𝑩𝑵𝑵−𝟏𝟏)𝜺𝜺𝑵𝑵, 
where 𝐵𝐵 = (𝐼𝐼 − 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊) and is commonly recognized as the spatial filter.  Therefore, the 
innovation 𝜀𝜀 may be temporally autocorrelated, but is not spatially correlated across units.  The 
remainder error 𝜀𝜀 is specified as a one way error component model to allow for the innovations 
to be correlated over time: 
(24) 𝜺𝜺𝑵𝑵 = (𝜾𝜾𝑻𝑻⨂𝑴𝑴𝑵𝑵)𝝁𝝁𝑵𝑵 + 𝑪𝑪𝑵𝑵, 
with 𝜇𝜇𝑁𝑁 the N x 1 vector of cross-sectional random components (i.e. the unobservable and time-
invariant individual specific effect) and 𝑣𝑣𝑁𝑁  the remainder disturbance varying over both the 
cross-sectional and temporal dimensions and 𝜄𝜄𝑁𝑁 is a vector of ones.  The specification of the error 
term is identical to that presented by Baltagi (2008) with the exception of the data are grouping. 
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Kapoor, Kelejian and Prucha (2007) maintain that both remaining error components, 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 , are i.i.d. with mean zero, variance 𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇2 and  𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2, respectively, and finite fourth 
moments.  In estimating the spatial autoregressive parameter and variance components, a 
generalized moment estimator is used as suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (1999).  The GM 
estimators use all moment conditions and an optimal weighting scheme based on the inverse of 
the variance covariance matrix of the sample moments at the true parameter values under the 
assumption of normally distributed innovations.  Kapoor, Kelejian and Prucha (2007) note that, 
while this matrix may not be strictly optimal in the absence of normality, it can be viewed as a 
reasonable approximation of the true variance covariance matrix.  The estimates of the spatial 
coefficient and variance components are then used to define a feasible generalized least square 
estimator (FGLS) by further transforming the (spatially transformed) model by pre-multiplying it 
by 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 − 𝜃𝜃𝑄𝑄1 , where 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇  is an identity matrix, 𝜃𝜃 = 1 − 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣 𝜎𝜎1�  and 𝑄𝑄1 is the standard 
transformation matrix well known in the error component literature.  The result is a doubly 
transformed model with estimators identical to that of OLS (Baylis, Garduño-Rivera, and Piras 
2009).  
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5.5  Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 6.  2008 Detrended Corn Yields for Illinois 
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Table 1. Farm Level Summary Statistics* 
 
Rent ExpYield Price Rural CV FtoCSPR OpAcre 
Year 
Cash 
rent per 
acre 
County 
corn 
yields 
Harvest 
price 
County 
ruralness 
Corn yield 
risk 
Intra-County 
Soil 
Productivity 
Total 
operating 
acreage 
1996 
111.57                  
(27.52)                   
[24, 192] 
128.11                        
(19.74)           
[87, 167] 
2.79 
0.71                              
(0.13)                      
[0.165, 0.903] 
0.168                             
(0.029)                      
[0.1, 0.24] 
1.005                              
(0.086)            
[0.699, 1.224] 
959.20                           
(539.27)                        
[120, 4093] 
1997 
115.39                       
(29.35)                   
[27, 212] 
121.02                        
(18.87)           
[80, 147] 
2.72 
0.72                              
(0.132)                                
[0.138, 0.921] 
0.164                           
(0.028)            
[0.1, 0.23] 
1.004                                      
(0.086)                                 
[0.699, 1.224] 
966.15                
(543.34)                   
[120, 4476] 
1998 
114.86                        
(28.95)                    
[17, 209] 
133.03                        
(20.70)                      
[82, 169] 
2.78
0.717                              
(0.135)               
[0.147, 0.911] 
0.159                          
(0.027)                         
[0.1, 0.23] 
1.004                           
(0.086)                      
[0.699, 1.224] 
988.10                        
(562.38)                      
[120, 4599] 
1999 
116.33                        
(30.44)                      
[27, 249] 
130.93                        
(22.93)                      
[73, 169] 
2.55
0.714                             
(0.131)                      
[0.149, 0.897] 
0.155                                       
(0.026)                    
[0.11, 0.22] 
1.006                 
(0.085)                      
[0.699, 1.224] 
1028.30                     
(588.40)                      
[120, 4749] 
2000 
118.94                        
(30.51)                      
[28, 250] 
145.39                        
(15.55)                      
[110, 176] 
2.35
0.72                              
(0.129)                                            
[0.172, 0.918] 
0.149                           
(0.025)       
[0.1, 0.21] 
1.006                           
(0.084)                      
[0.712, 1.224] 
1067.78                     
(615.63)                      
[120, 4779] 
2001 
120.07                       
(29.83)                    
[26, 223] 
147.34                        
(12.77)                      
[113, 173] 
2.53
0.716                              
(0.126)                    
[0.157, 0.903] 
0.148                          
(0.023)                      
[0.1, 0.2] 
1.007                           
(0.0841)                                 
[0.712, 1.224] 
1112.88                        
(691.87)                  
[120, 6163] 
* Reported Statistics are mean, (standard error), and [minimum, maximum] values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Table 1 (Cont.) 
 
Rent ExpYield Price Rural CV FtoCSPR OpAcre 
Year 
Cash 
rent per 
acre 
County 
corn 
yields 
Harvest 
price 
County 
ruralness 
Corn yield 
risk 
Intra-County 
Soil 
Productivity 
Total 
operating 
acreage 
2002 
119.76              
(31.24)                  
[33, 247] 
122.45                        
(35.76)                      
[43, 173] 
2.45 
0.717                              
(0.126)                      
[0.146, 0.93] 
0.144                          
(0.025)                                 
[0.1, 0.22] 
1.006                           
(0.083)                   
[0.712, 1.224] 
1113.06                         
(656.41)                       
[120, 4934] 
2003 
121.13                        
(29.83)                      
[19, 207] 
153.23                        
(29.85)                      
[76, 193] 
2.42
0.716                              
(0.125)                                 
[0.120, 0.910] 
0.140                          
(0.024)                    
[0.09, 0.21] 
1.008                           
(0.082)                      
[0.699, 1.224] 
1137.32                        
(692.53)           
[120, 4746] 
2004 
124.95                        
(31.01)                      
[27, 250] 
172.92                        
(17.77)                                 
[117, 199] 
2.45
0.720                              
(0.127)                      
[0.155, 0.923] 
0.138                          
(0.023)                      
[0.09, 0.21] 
1.008                           
(0.082)                                 
[0.699, 1.224] 
1158.32                     
(707.93)                    
[120, 4746] 
2005 
127.23                        
(31.85)                                            
[43, 245] 
137.51                                   
(15.85)                    
[108, 180] 
1.93
0.712                              
(0.129)                      
[0.151, 0.926] 
0.137                         
(0.022)                      
[0.09, 0.20] 
1.008                           
(0.082)                                 
[0.712, 1.224] 
1176.00                     
(742.97)                    
[120, 5975] 
2006 
129.25                        
(33.44)                      
[37, 265] 
155.12                        
(19.84)                      
[105, 186] 
2.42
0.713                              
(0.131)                                
[0.155, 0.930] 
0.133                          
(0.021)                      
[0.09, 0.20] 
1.01                              
(0.082)                      
[0.699, 1.224] 
1189.41                             
(783.79)                        
[120, 6375] 
2007 
139.56                        
(37.55)                      
[22, 266] 
167.31                        
(26.85)                                 
[100, 203] 
3.51
0.719                              
(0.135)                      
[0.167, 0.927] 
0.130                          
(0.019)                      
[0.09, 0.19] 
1.01                              
(0.083)                      
[0.699, 1.314] 
1195.14                     
(797.19)            
[120, 6177] 
2008 
159.32                        
(51.28)                      
[46, 356] 
169.88                        
(19.53)                      
[120, 207] 
4.28
0.712                             
(0.134)                      
[0.151, 0.956] 
0.126                           
(0.019)                                 
[0.09, 0.18] 
1.008                           
(0.081)                   
[0.676, 1.224] 
1192.65                     
(812.46)                       
[120, 6119] 
* Reported Statistics are mean, (standard error), and [minimum, maximum] values 
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Table 2. County Level Summary Statistics 
 
Rent ExpYield Price Rural CV 
Year Cash rent per acre 
County corn 
yields 
Expected 
harvest 
price 
County 
ruralness Corn yield risk 
1996 
114.7743                  
(38.53)            
[59, 338] 
128.11                        
(19.74)           
[87, 167] 
2.79 
0.67                              
(0.15)                      
[0.16, 0.90] 
0.17                              
(0.027)                      
[0.112, 0.242] 
1997 
111.08                       
(27.13)           
[57, 187] 
121.02                        
(18.87)           
[80, 147] 
2.72 
0.67                              
(0.15)                                
[0.14, 0.92] 
0.166                           
(0.026)               
[0.109, 0.238] 
1998 
113.09                        
(40.92)           
[22, 354] 
133.03                        
(20.70)           
[82, 169] 
2.78 
0.67                              
(0.15)               
[0.15, 0.91] 
0.161                           
(0.024)             
[0.111, 0.229] 
1999 
112.23                        
(38.64)                      
[11, 305] 
130.93                        
(22.93)                      
[73, 169] 
2.55 
0.67                              
(0.15)                      
[0.15, 0.90] 
0.158                                       
(0.024)                    
[0.107, 0.223] 
2000 
110.56                        
(27.3)                      
[27, 165] 
145.39                        
(15.55)                      
[110, 176] 
2.35 
0.68                              
(0.15)                                            
[0.17, 0.92] 
0.152                           
(0.023)                      
[0.104, 0.214] 
2001 
111.64                        
(28.35)                    
[29, 187] 
147.34                        
(12.77)                      
[113, 173] 
2.53 
0.67                              
(0.15)                    
[0.16, 0.90] 
0.148                           
(0.022)                      
[0.102, 0.206] 
* Reported Statistics are mean, (standard error), and [minimum, maximum] values 
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Table 2 (Cont.) 
 
Rent Yield Price Rural CV 
Year Cash rent per acre 
County corn 
yields 
Expected 
harvest 
price 
County 
ruralness Corn yield risk 
2002 
113.86              
(33.13)                  
[21, 215] 
122.45                        
(35.76)                      
[43, 173] 
2.45 
0.67                              
(0.15)                      
[0.15, 0.93] 
0.151                           
(0.027)                                 
[0.101, 0.223] 
2003 
114.71                        
(26.21)                      
[58, 179] 
153.23                        
(29.85)                      
[76, 193] 
2.42 
0.67                              
(0.16)                                 
[0.12, 0.91] 
0.148                           
(0.026)                      
[0.099, 0.225] 
2004 
118.12                        
(27.00)                      
[51, 169] 
172.92                        
(17.77)                                 
[117, 199] 
2.45 
0.68                              
(0.15)                      
[0.16, 0.92] 
0.145                           
(0.026)                      
[0.098, 0.219] 
2005 
119.08                        
(27.63)                                            
[41, 181] 
137.51                                   
(15.85)          
[108, 180] 
1.93 
0.67                              
(0.16)                      
[0.15, 0.93] 
0.144                           
(0.024)                      
[0.098, 0.211] 
2006 
121.46                        
(28.50)                      
[43, 186] 
155.12                        
(19.84)                      
[105, 186] 
2.42 
0.66                              
(0.16)                                
[0.16, 0.93] 
0.140                           
(0.023)                        
[0.097, 0.203] 
2007 
133.19                        
(38.67)                      
[58, 345] 
167.31                        
(26.85)                                 
[100, 203] 
3.51 
0.67                              
(0.16)                      
[0.17, 0.93] 
0.137                           
(0.022)                      
[0.098, 0.198] 
2008 
152.48                        
(50.04)                      
[52, 351] 
169.88                        
(19.53)                      
[120, 207] 
4.28 
0.67                              
(0.16)                      
[0.15, 0.96] 
0.133                           
(0.021)                                 
[0.096, 0.192] 
* Reported Statistics are mean, (standard error), and [minimum, maximum] values 
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Table 3. Independent Variables and Expected Signs 
 
 
 
 
 
PRICE
ExpYield
CV
RURAL
FtoCSPR
OpAcre
Symbol Variable Expected Sign
       
Corn Futures Price
Yield Risk
County Ruralness
Farm to County SPR
Total Operator Acres
(+)
(+)
(-)
(+,-)
(+)
(+)
Expected Yield
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Figure 7.  Urbanization in 2008 Proxied by County “Ruralness” 
County Ruralness (%) 
0 - 0.209 
0.21 - 0.509 
0.51 - 0.679 
0.68 - 0.819 
0.82 - 0.96 
Williamson  
Piatt 
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Table 4.  NASS Cash Rents and Analysis Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cash Rents by Year
Year NASS County Level Data Farm Level Data
1996 $106.00 $114.77 $111.57
1997 $109.00 $111.08 $115.39
1998 $111.00 $113.09 $114.86
1999 $111.00 $112.23 $116.33
2000 $119.00 $110.56 $118.94
2001 $119.00 $111.64 $120.09
2002 $122.00 $113.86 $119.76
2003 $123.00 $114.71 $121.13
2004 $126.00 $118.12 $124.95
2005 $129.00 $119.08 $127.22
2006 $132.00 $121.46 $129.25
2007 $141.00 $133.19 $139.56
2008 $160.00 $152.48 $159.32
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Table 5.  Moran's I Test Statistic by Year 
Year Farm County 
   
1996 .26* .77* 
1997 .21* .77* 
1998 .19* .71* 
1999 .20* .79* 
2000 .24* .77* 
2001 .28* .78* 
2002 .25* .82* 
2003 .21* .85* 
2004 .26* .81* 
2005 .25* .71* 
2006 .3* .78* 
2007 .28* .78* 
2008 .29* .70* 
*Significant at the .1% level 
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Chapter 6  Results 
 
Table 6 reports the results for the farm- and county-level spatial panel data analysis along with 
additional models for robustness checks.  All models regress cash rent per acre against the 
various attributes as previously discussed.  The coefficients have intuitively correct signs with 
the exception of the ruralness indicator, which was undetermined, and the risk measure in the 
county analysis.  The findings suggest there are significant spatial error correlations in both 
models with 𝜌𝜌 = 0.42 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 for the main farm and county analysis, respectively. 
First, there is strong evidence that the expected output price has a positive effect on real 
cropland cash rents and both analyses show this to be highly statistically significant.  The effect 
also appears to be very robust to different model specifications.  County level results find that 
marginal increases in the harvest futures price increases rents by around $24.00.  Under the farm 
level analysis, this measure rises to over $41.00, perhaps implying that the aggregation process 
has a significant loss of information.  The fact that these numbers are much smaller than previous 
studies is no surprise given that the hedonic framework allows for increasing prices and costs to 
interact dynamically within the hedonic price schedule.       
We also find strong evidence that the effect of inter-county soil productivity is positively 
associated with variations in rent levels. Statistical evidence also implies that intra-county 
variations impact rents positively, reinforcing the idea that soil quality is a prime indicator of 
agricultural returns and land rent.  In the county model, marginal increases in bushels per acre 
are associated with an approximate $1.94 rise in cash rents per acre.  At the farm level, cross-
county variations in yield increase rents by approximately $1.49 per acre.  Farm level SPR 
deviations from the overall county SPR are shown to have an approximate $8.67 increase 
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(decrease) for every 10% increment above (below) the county SPR mean.  This implies there is a 
premium for high quality land within counties and a discount for inferior land, as expected. 
The yield risk measure for the county analysis produced a positive coefficient, but was 
insignificant.  With the disaggregation of the county data, the farm level analysis produced a 
negative coefficient and was significant at the 5% level.  Specifically, the study finds that a 10% 
increase in a farmer's perceived risk has a negative impact on cash rent of $3.48 per acre.  Under 
the likely assumption that tenant farmers are risk averse, a negative coefficient on the risk 
variable is expected.   The production risk premium being observed is a result of this assumption 
and implies that the rental market is working efficiently in this capacity. 
The measure used for urbanization pressure was both significant and positive for both 
levels of estimation.  The hypothesized impact of this measure was initially undetermined.  This 
study provides evidence that urbanization has the opposite effect on agricultural cash rents as it 
does on agricultural land values (Huang et al. 2006).  The more rural a county or the county a 
farmer produces in, the higher the rent which can be expected.  We find that a 1% increase in 
county ruralness increases rents by approximately $37 per acre.  This phenomenon can be 
explained by the efficiencies gained in relatively rural counties.  It would be expected that 
counties relying more heavily on agriculture, and hence more rural areas, will have superior 
access to farm related inputs and machinery, such as grain elevators and large machinery leasing 
facilities.  Financing through agricultural lending institutions may also be more readily available 
in agricultural counties and the transaction costs relatively low given the lending institutions 
ability to keep close relationships with fewer clients.  Other considerations leading to this 
outcome, as described previously, may also include ease of bulky equipment navigation on 
public roadways and larger parcels uninterrupted by residential pockets and subdivisions. 
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The results indicate that the total acreage that a tenant farmer operates is associated with 
higher rents although the impact is rather minimal, yet statistically significant.  This study finds 
that marginal acreage increases are associated with a $0.01 increase in cash rents per acre.  This 
may be capturing a tenant farmer’s ability in that superior farming skills result in lower overall 
implicit costs enabling the tenant farmer to bid up the price of potential new tracts when 
attempting to increase their working land.  This describes the economies of scale that are 
associated with large-scale farming initiatives. 
Lastly, we find limited support for RRT with a majority of increased revenues due to 
output price increases accruing to the farmer.  Using the farm-level analysis, we find that the 
tenant farmer captures 89% of the marginal increases in commodity prices while the landowner 
and input suppliers absorb only 3.3% and 7.7%, respectively.  The relatively large amount that is 
captured by the tenant farmer may be a form of ‘compensation’ for bearing price risk.  This 
would imply that tenant farmers cash renting cropland receive both a premium for yield risk as 
well as price risk. 
Overall, both model specifications resulted in the expected signs of statistically 
significant variables with the farm level analysis obtaining a better overall fit to the sample data 
according to the pseudo-R2 measures as presented in the results table.  This is likely the result of 
the additional information gained when using disaggregated data, as well as the possibility for 
the inclusion of the additional variables capturing intra-county differences in soil productivities 
and the effects of operating efficiencies as measured by a tenant farmer’s scale of operation.  
Table 7 presents robustness checks using multiple alternative model specifications for the 
farm level.  The differing estimators use the fixed effects method rather than random effects as in 
the main model.  While the random effects may be seen as capturing the random components of 
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the tenant farmers, the fixed effects estimators are more explicitly capturing parcel-level 
heterogeneity.  Each alternative fixed effects specification uses a different method as to which 
effects are ultimately being captured, including cross-sectional specific effects, time-wise effects 
and both cross sectional and time-wise effects.  In other words, the cross-sectional variations first 
difference the individual observations across time to obtain the unobserved individual parcel 
affects whereas the time-wise fixed effects is capturing the unobserved variations across the 
individual panels as a whole.  In addition, the first four alternative specifications use a spatial lag 
variation instead of a spatial error component.  This form implies that the rent a tenant farmer 
pays is a function of his neighbors’ rent levels and that there are no spatial correlations present 
within the remainder error term.  If this is the case, the spatial lag model is seen to be an 
unbiased estimator.    
The coefficients for the price effect and productivity are similar to that of the main model 
implying that spatial error components model is not necessarily driving the results.  If the spatial 
lag estimator is in fact an unbiased estimator, it appears that the original error component model 
is also unbiased.   However, as compared to the first three alternative specifications, the error 
components model is more efficient as expected.  The coefficients for land productivity and the 
total amount of operator acres are also quite robust to the alternative specifications indicating 
that these are perhaps good measures of how these variables ultimately affect rent levels.   The 
coefficients association with yield risk, ruralness and intra-county productivity deviations change 
considerably between alternative specifications implying that the estimates given by the spatial 
error component model may not be a good measure of the true impact on rent levels.   
With the main focus of this paper being placed upon how commodity price levels affect 
rent levels, the results in Table 7 suggest that the estimates of the primary variable are not 
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particularly sensitive to the use of reasonable alternative specifications.  As this is a good fit of 
the data, the baseline results for the price measure, land productivity and the validity of 
Ricardian Rent Theory are seen as reasonable estimates for the final results. 
 
  
58 
 
6.1  Results Tables 
Table 6. Farm- and County-Level Results 
Dependent 
Variable                      
(Rent per Acre) 
Farm Level County Level 
Spatial 
Error 
Component 
Pooled OLS 
Random 
Effects       
(W/O 
Spatial) 
 
Spatial Error 
Component Pooled OLS 
       
Intercept -321.85*** -398.41*** -341.40***  -262.946*** -289.52*** 
 (-7.58) (-24.29) (-11.07)  (-7.65) (-20.40) 
PRICE 41.41*** 43.28*** 42.96***  23.987*** 18.47*** 
 (180.40) (171.50) (189.20)  (14.29) (13.483) 
ExpYield 1.490*** 1.59*** 1.52***  1.939*** 2.14*** 
 (6.37) (21.88) (10.35)  (10.07) (29.98) 
CV -173.94** -73.25* -198.98***  103.248 167.83*** 
 (-2.92) (-2.49) (-5.11)  (1.36) (3.804) 
RURAL 38.643* 52.97*** 44.03***  28.802* 41.23*** 
 (1.97) (8.30) (3.49)  (2.08) (6.13) 
FtoCSPR 86.443*** 109.78*** 91.85***    
 (5.44) (12.44) (5.43)    
OpAcre 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.013***    
 (5.32) (12.11) (6.28)    
ρ 0.4198    0.4964  
𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣
2 1619.86  1970.37  452.05  
𝜎𝜎12 12429.71    3225.46  
𝜃𝜃 0.639  0.6132  0.6256  
𝜎𝜎�2/𝜎𝜎2 0.8809    0.3224  
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑦𝑦,𝑦𝑦�)2 0.8985 0.8541 0.8729  0.6812 0.6862 
Time Periods 13 13 13  13 13 
Total 
Observations 5304 5304 5304  1014 1014 
       
Asterisks (*, **, ***) indicate that the statistic is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
hypothesis level.  T-statistics are given in parenthesis. 
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Table 7.  Farm Level Robustness Checks 
Dependent 
Variable                      
(Rent per Acre) 
Farm Level 
Spatial Lag 
(Pooled)1 
FE Lag                            
(Cross-Specific)2 
FE Lag                    
(Time-Specific)3 
FE Lag                           
(Spatial and 
Time)4 
FE Error          
(Cross 
Specific)5 
      
Intercept -321.85***     
 (-7.58)     
PRICE 41.46*** 40.93*** 43.10*** 42.79*** 41.08*** 
 (148.44) (164.82) (171.04) (205.69) (187.39) 
ExpYield 1.421***  1.546***   
 (19.81)  (23.47)   
CV -74.485** -323.20 24.01 15.71 -2.777*** 
 (-2.59) (-7.46) (.81) (0.20) (-3.76) 
RURAL 47.886*** -31.74 45.49*** -34.27 -7.59 
 (7.66) (-1.13) (8.06) (-1.42) (-1.62) 
FtoCSPR 110.78*** 30.8 110.05*** 19.95 18.38 
 (12.85) (0.98) (14.18) (0.75) (0.65) 
OpAcre 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.003 0.005 
 (12.55) (3.34) (12.82) (1.35) (1.77) 
ρ .0985*** .1*** .074*** .068*** 0.4946*** 
𝜎𝜎�2/𝜎𝜎2 .781 .832 .825 .881 .85 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑦𝑦�,𝑦𝑦)2 0.853 0.905 0.883 0.934 0.906 
Time Periods 13 13 13 13 13 
Total 
Observations 5304 5304 5304 5304 1014 
      1Spatial lag model using pooled panel 
2Spatial lag model using cross-sectional fixed effects 
3Spatial lag model using time period specific effects 
4Spatial lag model using cross-sectional and time-period effects 
5Spatial error model using cross-sectional fixed effects 
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Chapter 7  Summary and Conclusion 
 
It has generally been assumed that landowners would capture a large majority of increasing 
revenues when record-high corn prices are experienced.  However, this study indicates that 
landowners actually receive a very small portion.  Using more precise farm-level data, this study 
employs a novel spatial panel econometric approach by exploiting unique panel data from the 
Illinois FBFM data collection to analyze the determinants of agricultural cash rents.    We find 
that cropland cash rental rates in Illinois are largely determined by expected output prices, soil 
productivity, urbanization pressures, perceived risk and scale of farming operations.  In addition, 
we find very limited evidence to support RRT with a majority of increased revenues as a result 
of high commodity prices being capture by the tenant farmer.  In addition, the results indicate 
that substantial variation in cash rental rates exist across the state given the above characteristics.  
In contrast to previous studies, this aspect of heterogeneity across farmland parcels is 
investigated using a hedonic framework.  This study demonstrates that fluctuations in future 
output price expectations translate into substantial real cash rent movements with cash rents 
increasing by $41 for a $1 increase in corn prices.  These findings are less than those found in 
previous studies using a variable profit function approach and are likely the result of allowing the 
analysis to be set within a dynamic process where corresponding movements in input costs are 
built into the hedonic price schedule.  Ultimately, the hedonic framework allows for a more 
precise view of how output price movements flow through to the rental market and affect the 
unavoidable land costs borne onto tenant farmers.  The marginal value of land quality across 
Illinois counties is approximately $1.50, while intra-county quality variations are valued around 
$9.00 for 10% deviations from the respective county SPR mean.  Urbanization pressures are 
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found to have a negative effect on cash rents with a 1% increase in ruralness increasing rents by 
approximately $38.00.  Perceived production risks decrease rents by nearly $3.50, while the 
scale of farming initiatives increases rents marginally by only $0.01.    
This study also suggests that the use of farm level data outperforms that of aggregated 
county level.  The difference in the impacts of the price variable is hypothesized to be the result 
of the information lost when data is aggregated.  The use of farm level data appears to allow for 
increased accuracy in estimating the coefficients as noted by the overall model fit in comparison 
to the county level analysis. The occurrence of significant spatial correlations lends supporting 
evidence that the spatial model is also more efficient when estimating agricultural rental rates in 
comparison to a non spatial error component model.  Explicitly taking into account spatial 
considerations within the empirical model gives additional confidence when applying statistical 
inference to the coefficients as the standard BLUE assumptions are fully met. Future research 
pertaining to cash rents and their land value counterparts can benefit from the spatial 
observations presented in this study and aid researchers in deciding whether explicitly 
accounting for spatial connectedness between neighbors is an appropriate assumption and 
avoiding erroneous inferences from ordinary least squares estimation.      
There are many opportunities to take the results and approaches of this study and extend 
them to other questions.  Many studies have focused on the impacts of government programs on 
cash rents and whether the landlord or tenant is the ultimate beneficiary. These studies include 
Kirwan (2009), Lambert and  Griffin (2004), Rosine & Helmberger (1974), Featherstone and 
Baker (1988) and Goodwin and Ortalo-Magne (1992), amongst others.  These studies have 
produced conflicting evidence as to who ultimately receives government payments and the 
distribution of these payments among the two parties.  Using the framework and data presented 
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in this study will help provide a robust approach and more accurate information towards this 
question.  In correctly identifying and modeling the determinants of the cash rental process while 
incorporating the effects of government payments is expected to provide improved information 
for both public and private decisions.     
Exploring different weight matrix schemes at the farm level is another extension.  There 
are no tests to determine the correct spatial structure when applying spatial lag or error models.  
It would be interesting to generate multiple weighting schemes and see how the results change, if 
at all.  For example, this study uses a block structure in which every farmer within a county is a 
neighbor of all other farmers within that same county.  This ignores the fact that a farmer may be 
on the fringe of his/her county and may be a closer neighbor to a farmer in an adjacent county.  
Creating a weight structure that allows a farmer to be a neighbor of all farmers within his county 
as well as a neighbor to farmers in adjacent counties would be an alternative weight matrix.  
However, issues surrounding the asymptotics of the weight matrix must be observed.  By 
limiting the total number of neighbors a farmer may have at one time to an arbitrary number and 
through repeated random sampling of potential neighbors, multiple weight matrices can be 
formed and compared.  This would lend evidence to the overall efficiency of the resulting 
coefficient standard errors obtained and aid in future research with respect to farm level 
agricultural rents and statistical inference. 
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